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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an employment case alleging retaliation for reporting sexual harassment,
and alleging a negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against
Respondents. Respondents denied all of Appellant's claims and affirmatively asserted
that Appellant was discharged from his employment with the Meridian School District
due to poor performance.
On December 19, 2011, Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims: (1) hostile environment sexual harassment
claims brought pursuant to Title VII and the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); (2)
retaliation for reporting alleged sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and the IHRA;
(3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) defamation; (5)
tortious interference with perspective economic advantage; (6) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Appellants opposed the motion arguing: (1) that Appellant had been subjected to
a hostile work environment permeated with sexual innuendos; (2) that he experienced
adverse employment actions as a result of his report to the District Superintendent that
the building principal was sexually harassing him; and (3) that the conduct of
Respondent's defamed him, interfered with his future contractual opportunities with the
District and was performed in bad faith. Finally, Appellant also argued that the conduct
was extreme and outrageous and caused him emotional distress and/or that the
conduct breached a duty of care owed to him and caused him emotional distress.
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After reviewing the parties' briefing, and considering the oral argument of
counsel, on March 16, 2012, the District Court agreed with Respondents' position and
issued its decision granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed
all of Plaintiff's claims.
Appellant has appealed the District Court's grant for summary judgment alleging
primarily that there exist issues of material fact with regard to: (1) that the District's
stated reasons for adverse employment action are a pretext for illegal discriminatory
conduct; and (2) that the District owed a duty of care not to make demeaning comments
about Appellant.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts summarize the key facts relevant to Appellant Wade Frogley's

("Frogley's") appeal and to Respondents' defense that any adverse employment action
taken by Respondents regarding Frogley was taken solely as a result of his failure to
adequately perform his duties as an Assistant Principal at Mountain View High School,
and not for any unlawful or tortious reason.
On May 8, 2008, Human Resources Director Barbara Leeds emailed Frogley
informing him that Principal Aaron Maybon ("Principal Maybon") would be contacting
him to schedule an interview. (Affidavit of Barbara Leeds ("Leeds Aff'), p. 2, R. 160.)
Ms. Leeds informed Frogley that he would be offered a one-year contract (Leeds Aff, p.
2, R. 160; Barbara Leeds email to Wade Frogley, Exhibit "A" to Leeds Aff, R. 164.)
Thereafter, a State of Idaho Administrator's Contract was forwarded to Frogley for his
review and signature. (Leeds Aff, p. 2, R.160.) Frogley signed and returned the contract
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on January 15, 2009. (Leeds Aff, p. 2, R. 160; State of Idaho Administrators Contract,
dated January 15, 2009, Exhibit "B" to Leeds Aff, R. 165.)
The Job Description for the Assistant Principal position Frogley was hired to fill
clearly identified his overall supervisory responsibilities, including the specific obligation
that he identify and assist students having difficulties, which, as will be shown below,
Frogley failed to satisfy. (Affidavit of Aaron Maybon (Maybon Aff), pp. 2-20, R. 43-61;
Job Description, Assistant Principal, High School, Exhibit "A" to Maybon Aff, R. 64-65.)
As the school year progressed, however, several incidents occurred which
caused disruption amongst the administrative staff at Mountain View. (Maybon Aff, pp.
3-4, R. 44-45.) For example, on October 23, 2008, Assistant Principal Shana Hawkins
noticed that Frogley had left the building for lunch at 12:00 p.m. and did not return until
2:30 p.m. (Affidavit of Shana Hawkins ("Hawkins Aff'), pp. 2-3, R. 192-193.) Without
telling anyone ahead of time, Frogley had departed the building and had also failed to
take any steps to ensure his responsibilities were covered by other staff members in his
absence. (Maybon Aff, p. 4, R. 45.) Principal Maybon promptly explained to Frogley that
communication and coordination were required whenever he left the building to ensure
that all staff responsibilities were accomplished. (Maybon Aff, p. 4, R. 45; Shana
Hawkins letter, Exhibit "A" to Hawkins Aff, R. 196.)
A similar situation arose at about the same time when counselor Tammy
Schneider noted that Frogley had failed to attend a series of meetings regarding
Student Individual Education Plans (IEP's) and Student Section 504 meetings which
had been scheduled for Frogley's attendance as administrator. (Affidavit of Tammy
Schneider ("Schneider Aff), p. 2, R. 180.) Frogley failed to attend several such meetings
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between late October and early November 2008. (Schneider Aff, p. 2, R. 2; Emails and
notifications to Frogley of parent-teacher-counselor conferences collectively attached at
Exhibits "B" and "C" to Schneider Aff, R. 185-188.)
In addition, despite being counseled by Principal Maybon to be more mindful of
his duties as an Assistant Principal, on Tuesday, November 4, 2008, Assistant Principal
Shana Hawkins was asked to cover an IEP meeting in place of Assistant Principal
Frogley because he was absent at the time of the 3:00 p.m. meeting, and had failed to
make arrangements to have another administrator cover the meeting. (Maybon Aff, p. 4,
R. 45; Hawkins Aff, p. 3, R. 193; Shana Hawkins note, Exhibit "B" to Hawkins Aff, R.
197.)
On Wednesday, November 5, 2008, Principal Maybon met with Frogley and
discussed with him his poor job performance. (Maybon Aff, p. 5, R. 46.) The next day,
Principal Maybon prepared a four page letter to be placed in Frogley's file memorializing
several instances within a five day period beginning on Friday, October 31, 2008, and
running through Tuesday, November 4, 2008, wherein Frogley had failed to satisfy his
duties as Assistant Principal, including Frogley's continued insistence upon leaving the
building during working hours to work on his advanced degree. (Maybon Aff, p. 5, R. 56;
Maybon notes dated 11/6/2008, signed by Wade Frogley, Ex. "C" to Maybon Aff, R. 6871.) During this conversation, Frogley discussed with Principal Maybon his displeasure
with the joking amongst the staff about Frogley's "womanizing". (Maybon Aff, p. 6, R.
47.) In response, Principal Maybon assured Frogley that all such joking and innuendo
would cease. (Maybon Aff, p. 6, R. 47.) This report was the first time that Frogley had
raised any such concerns to Principal Maybon. (Maybon Aff, p. 6, R 47.) During this
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meeting with Principal Maybon, Frogley also complained about a faux wedding
announcement and photograph which depicted him in a fictitious marriage to a "cheap
two-bit tramp," which had occurred in August of 2008. (Maybon Aff, p. 6, R. 47.) These
topics were summarized by Principal Maybon's November 6, 2008, letter to the file
which was reviewed and signed by Frogley on November 13, 2008, without comment.
(Maybon Aff, 6, R. 47; Maybon Notes, Exhibit "C" to Maybon Aff, R. 68-71.)
As a result of the increasing reports of missed work assignments and obligations,
Principal Maybon examined Frogley's overall work performance to date and uncovered
an alarming pattern of job neglect. (Maybon Aff, p. 6, R. 47.) On November 7, 2008,
counselor Tammy Schneider provided Principal Maybon with a list of meetings Frogley
had failed to properly attend between October 28, 2008 and November 4, 2008
(Maybon Aff, p. 6, R. 47; Tammy Schneider note, Exhibit "A" to Schneider Aff, R. 184.)
Similarly, Maybon's review of teacher evaluations performed by Frogley revealed
that Frogley had failed to conduct timely evaluations for 18 of the 26 teachers over
whom he had supervisory responsibility. (Maybon Aff, p. 7, R. 48; Spreadsheet of
evaluations, Exhibit "D" to Maybon Aff, R. 72.)
As a result of Frogley's poor work performance, on November 11, 2008, Principal
Maybon prepared a Letter of Reprimand identifying five areas needing improvement:
1)

Absences from the building and failure to attend scheduled meetings;

2)

Failure to observe and prepare evaluations of teachers over whom Frogley
had supervisory responsibility;
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3)

Failure to satisfy professional

responsibilities

including

attendance at

meetings with Freshman teams, presence at parent meetings, and presence
at Section 504 and IEP meetings;
Poor communication with parents resulting in displeasure and agitation by the

4)

parents regarding Frogley's handling of situations; and
5)

Insubordination.

(Maybon Aff, p. 7, R. 48; Letter of Reprimand to Wade Frogley, Ex. "E" to Maybon Aff,
R. 73-74.)
In addition to the prior instances of job failure, on the morning of November 11,
2008, Frogley was scheduled to make a presentation at Special Education Symposium
hosted by Mountain View High School. (Maybon Aff, p. 7, R. 48.) Inexplicably, Frogley
missed his scheduled speaking assignment at the Symposium; and his only explanation
was that he had gone to the District Office, while admitting that he had failed to notify
anyone of his absence during his time to speak at the Symposium. (Maybon Aff, p. 7, R.
48.) Frogley's surprise absence from the Symposium caused Principal Maybon and the
rest of the administrative staff great embarrassment. (Maybon Aff, pp. 7-8, R. 48-49.)
On November 12, 2008, Principal Maybon met with Frogley and delivered to him
the Letter of Reprimand, the notes documenting Principal Maybon's and Frogley's prior
conversation, and a performance evaluation addressing Frogley's current short
comings. (Maybon Aff, p. 8, R. 49; Meeting Transcript, Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Janet
Brooks ("Brooks Aff), R. 127; Assistant Principal Evaluation, Exhibit "F" to Maybon Aff,

R. 73-74.)
The Performance Evaluation, dated November 12, 2008, noted Frogley's job
performance to date was deficient in two areas and unsatisfactory in four areas
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including leadership, interpersonal relations, professional responsibilities, and the
category "other" noted that Frogley had failed to follow directives, was insubordinate,
and that the trust between him and his principal had been damaged. (Maybon Aft, p. 8,
R. 49; Assistant Principal Evaluation, Exhibit "F" to Maybon Aft, R. 75-77.)
The following event illustrates Frogley's insubordinate, even childish attitude
toward his responsibilities as an Assistant Principal: At 3: 10 PM, on November 12,
2008, Frogley was informed that Principal Maybon wished to speak with him in the
Principal's office at 3:30 PM. (Brooks Aft, p. 2, R. 124.) At 3:35, when Frogley was late,
secretary Janet Brooks went to Frogley's office to see if he was busy and determine
why Frogley was not at the 3:30 meeting with Principal Maybon. (Brooks Aft, p. 2, R.
124.) Brooks observed Frogley merely sitting at his desk doing nothing. (Brooks Aft, p.
2, R. 124.) At 3:41 PM, Frogley wandered into Principal Maybon's office and never
attempted to explain his lateness or offer an apology. (Maybon Aft, p. 8, R. 49.)
Principal Maybon considered this yet another example of Frogley's insubordinate
attitude, and drafted a second Letter of Reprimand which was given to Frogley and
signed by Frogley on November 13, 2008 (Maybon Aft, pp. 8-9, R. 49-50; Letter of
Reprimand, Exhibit "G" to Maybon Aft, R. 78.)
That evening, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Frogley appeared at the home of
Principal Maybon to discuss the packet containing the Job Evaluation, Letter of
Reprimand and supporting documentation. (Maybon Aft, p. 9, R. 50.) Apparently,
Frogley hoped to have Principal Maybon drop the whole matter without further action,
and went so far as to allude to the fact that both he and Principal Maybon are members
of the same church. (Maybon Aft, p. 9, R. 50.) Principal Maybon immediately informed
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Frogley that his home was not the appropriate venue to discuss work issues, and when
Frogley realized that this private meeting was not going to remedy his situation, he
thanked the Principal for his time and left his home. (Maybon Aff, p. 9, R. 50; Principal
Maybon note dated November 12, 2008, Exhibit "H" to Maybon Aff, R. 79.)
On November 13, 2008, Principal Maybon called Frogley into his office and
informed Frogley that he was being placed on a Level II Improvement Plan; and the
second Letter of Reprimand dated November 12, 2008, was delivered to Frogley at that
time. (Maybon Aff, p. 9, R. 50; Transcript, dated November 13, 2008, Exhibit "B" to
Brooks Aff, R. 128-129.) The intensified Level 11 Improvement Plan identified eleven
areas where Frogley needed improvement and also identified several specific strategies
designed to assist Frogley in meeting the improvement objectives. (Maybon Aff, p. 10,
R. 51; Expanded Improvement Plan, attached at Exhibit "I" to Maybon Aff, R. 80-85.)
Despite being placed on a Plan of Improvement on November 131h, a mere eight
days later, on November 21, 2008, Frogley received his third Letter of Reprimand.
(Maybon Aff, p. 10, R. 51.) The third letter noted that on November 14, 2008 (only two
days after his placement on a Plan of Improvement) Frogley had again failed to
supervise students in the cafeteria as required by his job, and continued to do so until
he was directed by Principal Maybon. (Maybon Aff, p. 10, R. 51.) In addition, Frogley
had previously failed to conduct a required meeting with his assigned freshman team
back in September, and the report discussing the meetings, which had been due in
October of 2008, remained unfinished as of November 20, 2008. (Maybon Aff, p. 10, R.
51.) Frogley was informed that these failures were unacceptable. (Maybon Aff, p. 10, R.
51.) Finally, Principal Maybon discovered that Frogley had made only one entry in the

RESPONDEl\JTS' BRIEF - 8

"Power Schools" database system wherein disciplinary activities are entered into a
school-wide database. (Maybon Aff, p. 10, R. 51.) Principal Maybon was personally
aware of several disciplinary matters which had not been recorded into the system, and
Frogley was also reprimanded for this failure. (Maybon Aff, p. 10, R. 51; Letter of
Reprimand, attached at Exhibit "J" to Maybon Aff, R. 86.) 1
When Principal Maybon delivered the November 21, 2008, Letter of Reprimand
to Frogley, he again demonstrated his arrogant and insubordinate behavior toward
Principal Maybon by ignoring Principal Maybon when he entered Frogley's office and
continuing to work on his computer, forcing Principal Maybon to wait in the doorway
while Frogley took his time getting to the letter. Frogley finally looked at the letter,
signed it, and without comment slid it across his desk to Principal Maybon. (Maybon Aff,
p. 11, R. 52; Note dated November 21, 2008, Exhibit "C" to Brooks Aff, R. 130.)
Despite the multiple Letters of Reprimand already in Frogley's file, a mere three
days after the latest letter, on November 24, 2008, Frogley was again at least 30
minutes late for his scheduled supervisory post at the cafeteria. (Affidavit of Heath
Mcinerney (Mcinerney Aff), p. 2, R. 137; Note by Heath Mcinerney, Exhibit "A" to
Mcinerney Aff, R. 142.)
More importantly, however, on November 24, 2008, a female student named
C.D. reported a prior incident wherein Frogley had, without reason, touched, harassed,
and mocked Ms. D., leaving her quite shaken and afraid. (Maybon Aff, p. 12, R. 53.)
Two other students, M.J. and 1.0., had witnessed the incident involving C.D. and
provided written statements to Assistant Principal Mcinerney. (Mcinerney Aff, pp. 2-3,
1

Exhibit "K" to the Maybon Aff, shows the Power School log entries referred to into the Letter of
Reprimand dated November 21, 2008, and the log entries of other Assistant Principals.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 9

R. 142-143.) Assistant Principal Mcinerney then prepared a document titled "Sequence
of Events," memorializing C.D.'s complaints and the corroborating statements of M.J.
and 1.0 and then provided them to Principal Maybon. (Maybon Aff, p. 12, R. 53;
Mcinerney Aff, p. 3, R. 143; Documents regarding G.D. harassment, Exhibits "C", "D",
and "E" to Mcinerney Aff, R. 144-146.)
Incredibly,

and

despite

the

repeated

and

specific identification

of his

shortcomings, Frogley continued his pattern of insubordination and failure to supervise
the students in the cafeteria, at basketball games when assigned to monitor such
events, and in the hallways between class periods. (Maybon Aff, p. 13, R. 54; Letter
from Principal Maybon to Wade Frogley, Exhibit "M" to Maybon Aff, R. 95-96.)
Thereafter,

additional

instances

of Frogley's

failure

to

coordinate

and

communicate with other staff members occurred. On December 11, 2008, Frogley
contacted Amy Shumway at 3:23 p.m. to inform her of a teacher's meeting which would
occur in seven minutes at 3:30 p.m. (Note dated December 11, 2008, signed by Amy
Shumway on December 12, 2008, Exhibit "M1" to Maybon Aff, R. 97.) Frogley's lack of
prior notice put Ms. Shumway in a difficult situation as she had a prior commitment
scheduled for 4:00 p.m. (Id.) Nonetheless, the parent showed up at 3:35 p.m. and Ms.
Shumway attended the meeting. (Id.) Ms. Shumway subsequently reported the event to
Principal Maybon. (Maybon Aff, pp. 12-13, R. 53-54.)
At about that same time, an administrator received a report from student M.C.
documenting multiple incidents wherein Frogley had apparently reprimanded her and
embarrassed her for very little reason. (Maybon Aff, p. 14, R. 55.) This treatment had
occurred on multiple occasions from the date of the Homecoming Dance in October of
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2008, through December of 2008, at which time M.C. believed she needed to report the
problems to the administrative staff. (Maybon Aff, p. 14, R. 55.) Ms. Compton's
boyfriend, L.K., provided a corroborating statement documenting Frogley's harassing
conduct. (Maybon Aff, p. 14, R. 55.) Finally, on December 15, 2008, M.C.'s mother,
Doreen C., sent an email to Principal Maybon expressing her dissatisfaction with
Frogley's mistreatment of her daughter. (Maybon Aff, p. 14, R. 55; Student reports and
emails discussing M.C., Exhibit "N" to Maybon Aff, R. 98-99.)
And the problems with Frogley continued to mount. On December 15, 2008,
Frogley again failed to satisfy his supervisory duties at lunch, and also failed to
coordinate or communicate with either Principal Maybon or another staff member to
notify them he would not be at the cafeteria on time, nor did he make arrangements to
provide supervision in his absence. (Maybon Aff, p. 14, R. 55; Principal Maybon note,
Exhibit "O" to Maybon Aff, R. 102.)
On December 16, 2008, an anonymous letter was delivered to Superintendent
Clark, Principal Maybon and Mr. Rowe reporting yet another incident of inappropriate
harassing conduct on the part of Frogley toward a female student. (Maybon Aff, p. 15,
R. 56; Letter dated December 16, 2008, Exhibit "P" to Maybon Aff, R. 103.)
On February 3, 2009, Principal Maybon met with staff member Melynda
Mortensen regarding a reported incident wherein Melynda and Frogley were observed
sitting in Frogley's office talking during a basketball game which Frogley was assigned
to supervise. (Maybon Aff, p. 15, R. 56; Affidavit of Melynda Mortensen ("Mortensen
Aff") p.2, R. 199.) During the course of Principal Maybon's discussion with Ms.
Mortensen about Frogley's failure to supervise the basketball game, Principal Maybon
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learned that Frogley had been manipulating Ms. Mortensen to cause her to believe that
the administrative team disliked her. (Maybon Aft, p. 15, R. 56; Summary of meeting
between Maybon and Mortensen, Exhibit "Q" to Maybon Aft, R. 104.) Principal Maybon
asked Ms. Mortensen to prepare a statement, and she submitted to him a statement
dated February 4, 2009, wherein she documented multiple conversations she had had
with Frogley from August 2008 through January of 2009, wherein Frogley had
complained about some of his circumstances and attempted to either get information
from Mortensen, or cause her to feel Frogley was her ally (against the rest of the staff).
(Maybon Aft, p. 16, R. 57; Mortensen Aft, pp. 2-3, R. 199-200; Melynda Mortensen
Statement, Exhibit "A" to Mortensen Aft, R. 204, Exhibit "R" to Maybon Aft, R. 105-106.)
Mortensen's note written in February 2009 does not recall any complaint about "sexual
harassment." (Id.)
On February 11, 2009, after Principal Maybon had informed Frogley that he had
failed to supervise students at a basketball game, Frogley created a pretext to walk with
Ms. Mortensen through the school hallways and proceeded to aggressively question her
regarding whether she had "ratted on him" about the basketball game. (Mortensen Aft,
p.3, R. 201; Maybon Aft, p. 16-17, R. 57-58.) Ms. Mortensen spoke with Assistant
Principal Mcinerney and also prepared a written statement recounting the incident on
February 11, 2009, wherein she described the incident and its effect on her. (Mortensen
Aft, p. 3, R. 201; Maybon Aft, pp. 16-17, R. 57-58; Statement dated February 11, 2009,
Exhibit "B" to Mortensen Aft, R. 206.) Following her encounter with Frogley, Assistant
Principal Mcinerney noted that Ms. Mortensen appeared visibly shaken. (Mcinerney Aff,
p. 4, 139.) Assistant Principal Mcinerney also observed that Ms. Mortensen was pale,
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and her eyes were watery. (Mcinerney Aff, pp. 4-5, R. 139-140; Statement Heath
Mcinerney, Exhibit "G" to Mcinerney Aff, R. 149.) After speaking with Ms. Mortensen,
Assistant Principal Mcinerney approached Frogley about the incident and informed him
that he could write a statement if he so desired. (Id.)
Assistant Principal Mcinerney presented the Frogley/Mortensen matter to
Principal Maybon on February 12, 2009. (Maybon Aff, p. 17, R. 58.) Principal Maybon
conducted his own investigation and prepared a report summarizing his findings
regarding Melynda Mortensen's complaint of harassment against Frogley. (Maybon Aff,
p. 17, R. 58; Maybon Investigation Report Exhibit "T" to Maybon Aff, R. 108-109.)
During Principal Maybon's investigation, Ms. Mortensen informed Principal Maybon that
Frogley had been agitated and aggressive when he had encountered her and he
accused her of "ratting him out." (Maybon Aff, p. 17, R. 58.) Ms. Mortensen reported that
the entire encounter had been extremely uncomfortable for her, and she had tried on
several occasions to separate herself from Frogley. (Maybon Aff, p. 17, R. 58.) In fact,
the incident involving Frogley so upset Ms. Mortensen that she became ill and asked to
have the rest of the day off. (Maybon Aff, p. 17, R. 58; Mortensen Aff, p. 4, R. 202.)
Principal Maybon assured Ms. Mortensen that steps would be taken to ensure that
Frogley would not approach her again, and he informed her that if Frogley harassed her
again that she was to promptly notify him or another staff member. (Maybon Aff, p. 17,
R. 58; Maybon Investigation Report, Exhibit 'T' to Maybon Aff, 108-109.)
Principal Maybon met with Frogley to hear his version of the incident involving
Ms. Mortensen and asked Frogley to prepare a written response. (Maybon Aff, p. 18, R.
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59; W. Frogley - Response to Allegations of M. Mortensen, Exhibit "U" to Maybon Aff,
R. 110-113.)
On February 13, 2009, Principal Maybon sent a report to Human Resources
Director Barbara Leeds documenting the harassment incident involving Frogley and Ms.
Mortensen and stating that his review of the video surveillance tape confirmed Ms.
Mortensen's version of events. (Maybon Aff, p. 18, R. 59.) In his report, Principal
Maybon further informed HR Director Leeds that Frogley's job performance remained
deficient and that Frogley was not in compliance with his Level II Plan. (Maybon Aff, p.
18, R. 59; Principal Maybon Report to Human Resources Director Barbara Leeds,
Exhibit "V" to Maybon Aff, R. 114; Copy of video surveillance of Frogley/Mortensen
Incident, Exhibit "W" to Maybon Aff, R. 115.)
On February 19, 2009, Principal Maybon prepared a summary of his
investigation regarding the Frogley-Mortensen incident of February 11, 2009, describing
the video surveillance findings, and his interviews of Ms. Mortensen and Assistant
Principal Mcinerney. (Maybon Aff, pp. 18-19, R. 59-60; Principal Maybon Incident
Summary Report, Exhibit "X" to Maybon Aff, R. 116-117.)
In response to Principal Maybon's request for a written statement regarding the
incident involving Ms. Mortensen, Frogley prepared a four page document rebutting Ms.
Mortensen's claim of harassment, setting forth his version of events, including the
history with Ms. Mortensen, and the basketball supervision incident. (See, Frogley' s
Statement, Exhibit "U" to Maybon Aff, R. 110-113.)
Following the investigation of Frogley's harassment of Melynda Mortensen, and
the reports of student harassment involving Ms. D. and Ms. C., Frogley was placed on
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administrative leave pending further investigation of the alleged incidents. (Maybon Aff,
p. 19, R. 60; Affidavit of Dr. Linda Clark ("Clark Aff'), pp. 3-4, R. 152-153.) In March
2009, Frogley was transferred from paid administrative leave and reassigned to
administrator of special projects at the District Service Center where he would have no
duties regarding student supervision or employee evaluation, and would perform
administrative duties only. (Clark Aff, pp. 3-4, R. 152-153; Letter from Trish Duncan,
attached at Exhibit "A" to Clark Aff, R. 156.)
Frogley completed his employment with the Meridian School District in this
capacity (though he never reported to his new administrative position due to "illness"),
and on May 12, 2009, Superintendent Linda Clark recommended to the Board of
Trustees that the District not offer a new administrative contract to Frogley for the 20092010 school year as a result of his poor performance. (Clark Aff, pp. 4-5, R. 153-154;
Letter from Linda Clark to the Board of Trustees, Exhibit "B" to Clark Aff, R. 157-158.)
Frogley thereafter filed a timely Charge of Discrimination with the Idaho Human
Rights Commission (IHRC) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC); and on February 10, 2010, the IHRC issued it Investigator's Report and
Commission Determination rendering a finding of "No Probable Cause" to believe
unlawful discrimination had occurred and dismissed his claims of discrimination.
(Investigator's Report and Commission Determination, dated February 1, 2010,
attached at Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Counsel, pp.1-4, R. 211-214.)
In summary, the above recitation of events clearly reveals that during the 20082009 school year, Appellant Wade Frogley had completely failed to perform his duties
as an Assistant Principal at Mountain View High School, thereby requiring Principal
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Maybon to take corrective action. This corrective action, however, infuriated Frogley and
he fabricated incidents of "harassment" and "requests that the harassment" cease, in an
effort to claim that the disciplinary actions taken by Principal Maybon were not legitimate
and in retaliation to Frogley's requests that Principal Maybon stop "harassing" him.
Frogley's claims of "harassment" and "retaliation" are clearly fabrications intended to
deflect responsibility from Frogley for his woeful performance as an Assistant Principal.
Given the legitimacy of the District's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, and the
false/pretextual nature of Plaintiffs allegations of harassment, there clearly exists no
basis for any of Frogley's claims in this matter, and all of his causes of action should be
dismissed for the reason that there exist no genuine issues of material fact for a jury to
determine.

C.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On

May

3,

2010,

Plaintiff/Appellant

filed

his

Complaint

against

Defendants/Respondents in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of
Ada.
On October 26, 2010, Plaintiff/Appellant filed his First Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial.
On November 4, 2010, Defendants/Respondents filed their Answer to Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff/Appellant filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
of Defendant Idaho State Board of Education.
On December 19, 2011, Defendants/Respondents filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking dismissal of all Plaintiffs causes of action.
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On March 16, 2012, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting and Denying in Part Motion to Strike and Granting Motion for Summary
Judgment.
On March 29, 2012, the Court entered Judgment.
On March 30, 2012, Defendants filed their Memorandum of Costs.
On May 21, 2012, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the instant Notice of Appeal.
II. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL

Following are Respondents' restated issues on appeal:
1. When the trial court dismissed Frogley's retaliation claims, did it err in concluding
that there was no evidence that Respondents' stated reasons for adverse
employment action were actually a pretext for retaliation intended to penalize
Frogley for allegedly reporting a claim of sexual harassment?
2. When the trial court dismissed Frogley's negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim, did the court err in concluding, as a matter of law, that Respondents did
not owe Frogley a duty of care under the circumstances?
B. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and IAR 41?
In the event Respondents are deemed the prevailing party to this appeal,
Respondents hereby claim entitlement to their reasonable attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho §§ 12-117, 12-121, and /AR 41, in addition to its costs of appeal to which it is

entitled pursuant to /AR 40.
Respondents are entitled to attorney fees on appeal because the appeal was
brought frivolously and without foundation, and Appellant has failed to make a good
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faith argument for the extension of existing law. Martin v Twin Falls School District,
138 Idaho 146, 150 (2002).
Specifically, on the issue whether Respondents' legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its adverse action are unrebutted by any evidence of pretext; Appellant has
identified no direct evidence of any retaliatory intent by Respondents, nor has he
provided any indirect evidence that the stated, nondiscriminatory reasons are unworthy
of credence and that the adverse employment action was motivated by retaliatory
animus. See, Chuang v University of California Davis, 225 F. 3d 115 (9 1h Cir 2000);
Godwin v Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F. 3d 1217 (1998).

Similarly, Appellant has identified absolutely no evidence that Respondent owed
a duty of care under the circumstances to refrain from making statements which would
cause him to feel bad. To the contrary, the law in Idaho clearly states there is no duty to
refrain from making derogatory statements about another person. Johnson v. McPhee,
147 Idaho 455, 468 (Ct. App. 2009) ("in ordinary circumstances ... it would not be
foreseeable that insulting and demeaning remarks ... could inflict serious emotional
harm").
There being no reasonable basis in fact or law the appeal, and no reasonable
argument for the extension of existing law, an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal are therefore warranted. l.C. §§ 12-117, 12-121, /AR 40, 41.
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing on appeal the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the
appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.
Sadid v Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011 ).
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The appellate court

construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from the record, in
favor of the non-moving party.

Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the

evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the issues stated in the pleadings and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., citing, lnfanger v City of Salmon, 137
Idaho 45, 46-47 (2002) A trial court's determination of whether a legal duty existed
under the circumstances is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises
free review. Freeman v Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556-57 (1991).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of
proving the absence of a material fact, and all evidence is construed liberally and all

reasonable inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party. Sherer v Pocatello
School District No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489 (2006).

After the moving party has

satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with sufficient
admissible evidence identifying specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine
issue for trial. Id. at 489-90; IRCP 56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or
depositions as well as other material based upon personal knowledge which would have
been admissible at trial. Id. at 490, citing Harris v State, Department of Health and

Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98 (1992). Although circumstantial evidence can create a
genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. STATEMENTS OF LAW
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1.

EVIDENCE OF "PRETEXT" IN THE CONTEXT OF RETALIATION CLAIMS BROUGHT
PURSUANT TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE IDAHO HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT (IHRA).

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that Appellant had failed to
identify sufficient, admissible evidence to allow a jury to find that the legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for Respondents' adverse employment action were actually a pretext
for retaliation against Appellant as punishment because he had reported sexual
harassment due to the conduct of Principal Mayben and his staff. (App. Br., pp. 11-13.)
Retaliation claims under the IHRA are governed by the same legal standard as
for similar federal Title VI I claims, and as a result, both causes of action will be
discussed together. Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128 Idaho 740, 743-744 (1996); De
Los Santos v. J.R. Simplot Co., 126 Idaho 963, 967 (1995); Hoppe v. McDonald, 103

Idaho 33, 37 (1982).
In Idaho, retaliation claims are analyzed using the familiar McDonnell Douglass
burden shifting analysis:
We recently set out the peculiar dynamics of a retaliation
claim under Title VII in Payne v. Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d
1079 (9th Cir. 1997)We noted that a plaintiff must show (1)
involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse
employment action and (3) a causal link between the two.
See id. at 1080. Thereafter, the burden of production shifts
to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse
employment action. Once the employer carries this burden,
plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the reason advanced by the employer was a
pretext. See id. Only then does the case proceed beyond the
summary judgment stage.
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000).

In the instant matter, the trial court concluded that Appellant had satisfied his
prima facie case, and also concluded that Respondents had presented legitimate
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reasons for the alleged employment action. (Mem. Dec., pp. 22-25, R. 429-432.) The
trial court went on to hold that Appellant had thereafter failed to advance evidence
sufficient to create an issue of fact showing that the employer's stated reason was
actually a pretext for illegal retaliation; and therefore granted summary judgment on
Appellant's retaliation claims. (Mem. Dec., pp. 25-26, R. 432-433.) Appellant claims the
trial court erred in concluding there was no evidence of pretext; therefore, the legal
standard for analyzing the pretext issue is set forth in detail below.
In the case of Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., the Ninth Circuit analyzed and
described the type and quantum of evidence required to satisfy an employee's burden
of production at the summary judgment stage and thereby

demonstrate that the

employer's stated reasons are actually a pretext for discrimination or retaliation, and
thereby stave off summary judgment. See, Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d
1217, 1220-1222 (9th Cir. 1998). Of course, the ultimate burden of persuading the jury
that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee remains at all times
with the employee/plaintiff. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220.
Generally, at the pretext stage, a plaintiff must "produce evidence in addition to
that which was sufficient for [his] prima facie case in order to rebut the defendant's
showing." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220. There are two types of evidence which can be
offered on the issue of pretext: (1) direct evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent;
and (2) indirect or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent. Chuang
v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that employer's
statement that "two chinks" in the department was enough, and colleague's "laughing
response" to the remark were direct evidence of racial discrimination).
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"Direct evidence" is defined as "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of
discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.
Statements such as "dumb Mexican," "little old ladies" and "old warhorse," or statements
evidencing clear "sexual stereotyping" are considered "direct evidence" of discriminatory
animus. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of
discriminatory (or retaliatory) motive, a triable issue of as to the employer's actual
motivation is created even if the evidence is not substantial. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.
"Indirect evidence" is defined as: "circumstantial evidence that tends to show that
the employer's proffered motives were not the actual motives because they are
inconsistent or otherwise not believable. Such evidence of 'pretense' must be 'specific'
and 'substantial' in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer
intended to discriminate on the basis of sex." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222. Where an
employee offers indirect evidence, to survive summary judgment, the employee "must
set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts,

not sweeping conclusory

allegations." Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061
(9th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment dismissing retaliation claim affirmed - no evidence of

pretext). When determining whether the employer's reasons were false and pretextual,
"it is not important whether they were objectively false ... Rather, courts 'only require that
an employer honestly believed its reasons for its actions, even if its reason is 'foolish or
trivial or even baseless.' (Citation omitted)'." Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1063 (emphasis in
original). Instead, the employee must offer evidence that the employer "did not believe
its proffered reasons." Id.
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In this case there is no direct evidence of retaliatory intent or animus toward
Frogley because he reported a complaint of sexual harassment; nor is there specific,
substantial, indirect evidence retaliatory intent, and the court's grant of summary
judgment should therefore be affirmed.

2.

THE DUTY OF CARE OWED IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

In Idaho, a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is governed by the
following standard:
These elements are: (1) a duty recognized by law requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between
the conduct and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73,
78 (1995); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., 119 Idaho
at 175-76, 804 P.2d at 904-05; Nation, 144 Idaho at 189,
158 P.3d at 965. In addition to these elements, for a claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress to lie, there must be
some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional
injury. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., 119 Idaho at
177, 804 P.2d at 906; Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School Dist.
No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 332, 775 P.2d 640, 646 (1989); but
see Brown, 118 Idaho at 837, 801 P.2d at 44 (adopting an
exception to physical manifestation requirement in some
cases involving mishandling of dead bodies).
Johnson, 147 Idaho at 466.

Appellant alleges the trial court erred when it held at page 20 of its Memorandum
Decision that there was: "insufficient evidence of foreseeability to show that Defendants
owed Frogley a duty of care." (Appellant's Brief, 18-19.)
On the issue of legal duty, every person generally "has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Johnson,
147 Idaho at 467. The legal obligation arises, however, only under circumstances where
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"it was reasonably foreseeable that [the resulting] harm would flow from the negligent
conduct." Johnson, 147 Idaho at 467. As a result, mere insulting or demeaning
comments are insufficient to create a duty of care because "in ordinary circumstances of
social interaction, it would not be foreseeable that insulting and demeaning remarks like
those attributed to [defendant] could inflict serious emotional harm." Johnson, 147
Idaho at 468. 2 This rule arises from public policy which generally precludes liability for
hurt feelings:
The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good
deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no
occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some
one's feelings are hurt.
Johnson, 147 Idaho at 468.

This general rule is, however, subject to an exception where there is evidence
that the defendant had knowledge of a plaintiffs particular or idiosyncratic sensitivity to
emotional harm, and nonetheless, acted negligently in light of the circumstances.
Johnson, 147 Idaho at 468. The Court of Appeals described this exception as follows:
Liability can arise from otherwise unactionable conduct
if the conduct caused serious emotional harm to a
peculiarly fragile individual and the defendant knew or
should have known of the individual's susceptibility. As
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 313 (1965),
comment c, "[O]ne who unintentionally but negligently
subjects another to such an emotional distress does not take
the risk of any exceptional physical sensitiveness to emotion
which the other may have unless the circumstances known
to the actor should apprise him of it." (emphasis added). A
2

In the event Appellant argues recovery for emotional distress in connection with a contract claim, this
Court has held that damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in a breach of contract claim.
Thomas v Medical Center Physicians, 138 Idaho 200, 211 (2002).
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treatise refers to this concept as a "pervading principle of tort
law," saying:
Generally defendant's standard of conduct is measured
by the reactions to be expected of normal persons ....
Activity may be geared to a workaday world rather than
to the hypersensitive. It may be otherwise, however, if
defendant has knowledge or notice of the presence of
idiosyncrasy in any given case. This, of course, is the
application of a pervading principle of tort law. Fowler v.
Harper et al., 3 The Law of Torts § 18.4, at 691-92 (2d
ed.1986).
Johnson, 147 Idaho at 468 (bold-italics added).

In this case there is no evidence Plaintiff/Appellant had an idiosyncratic
to

sensitivity

insulting

or

demeaning

remarks;

nor

is

there

any

evidence

Defendants/Respondents had any knowledge of such sensitivity if it was present (which
Respondents deny), and the trial court's grant of summary judgment should therefore
be affirmed.

8.

ANALYSIS: APPLICATION OF FACTS TO LAW

1.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO IDENTIFY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF PRETEXT.

Appellant argues that his conversation with Supt. Linda Clark on November 11th
2008, and the school district's subsequent adverse employment action is "direct
evidence" that Frogley was illegally retaliated against because he had reported to Supt.

Clark instances of alleged sexual harassment. (App. Br., p. 11.)
However, simply calling evidence "direct evidence" does not make it so. The
Ninth Circuit has defined "direct evidence" of discriminatory [or retaliatory] intent as:
"evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference
or presumption." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. The 9th Circuit provided some examples of
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"direct evidence," comments such as "dumb Mexican," "little old ladies" and "old
warhorse," and statements which evidence clear "sexual stereotyping" are considered
"direct evidence." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. Only where a plaintiff offers direct
evidence of discriminatory (or retaliatory) motive, will a triable issue as to the

employer's actual motivation be created where the evidence is otherwise not
substantial. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.
No "direct evidence" of retaliatory intent has been provided in this case.

Direct evidence of retaliatory intent would exist if there was a statement attributed to
Respondents which clearly indicated that Frogley was going to be punished or retaliated
against because he had reported alleged sexual harassment. Godwin, 150 F.3d at
1221. Such a statement would be "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of
discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.
Frogley's speculative inference that such had occurred, however, is not sufficient to
transform his speculative "indirect evidence" into the category of "direct evidence."
Indeed, in his Brief, Appellant argues that a "reasonable inference" from the sequence
of events described above is that "Dr. Clark and Mr. Maybon intended to punish Mr.
Frogley for his complaining about sexually based harassment." (App. Br., p. 11.)
Contrary to Appellant's assertion, "direct evidence" does not, as a matter of law, require
any inference to reach the conclusion of discriminatory animus, and his statement
regarding a "reasonable inference" is a tacit admission that the so-called "direct
evidence" is actually speculative, "indirect evidence." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.3

Frogley relies on the 91h Circuit case of Chuang v. UC Davis, to support his argument. However, that
case is easily distinguished from the case at bar. For one, in Chuang, the plaintiff had provided significant
evidence of racial harassment - including the referenced "two chinks" comment. Chuang, 225 F.3d at
1128-29. In contrast, Appellant's underlying hostile environment, sexual harassment claims were
3
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Thus, instead of "direct evidence" of retaliatory intent, Appellant's cited
evidence is nothing more than weak, circumstantial evidence which is insufficient
as a matter of law to create an issue of fact regarding whether or not
Respondent's stated reasons were a pretext for retaliation. Godwin, 150 F.3d at
1222 (indirect or circumstantial evidence of pretext must be "specific" and "substantial"
to create a triable issue of fact of intent to discriminate). Said another way, "[t]o survive
summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts,
not sweeping conclusory allegations." Cafasso v. General Dynamics, 637 F.3d 1047,
1061 (9th Cir. 2011 ). "Merely denying the credibility of the employer's proffered reasons
is insufficient to withstand summary judgment." Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865
(9th Cir. 2010). An employer is allowed to be wrong, or to have poor reasons for it

actions; the evidence must show that the employer did not believe its stated reasons,
and punished the employee for engaging in a protected act. Villarimo v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) ("courts 'only require that an employer
honestly believed its reasons for its actions, even if its reason is 'foolish or even
baseless"'). Thus, in a retaliation case, where a plaintiff offers nothing more than
conjecture on the issue of discriminatory intent, summary judgment is appropriate.

Clemmons v. Hawaii Medical Services Ass'n, 836 F.Supp.2d 1126, 1141-42
(D.Hawaii 2011) (granting summary judgment and holding that proximity in time, though
sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, is insufficient to create an issue
of pretext where legitimate reasons are provided - absent evidence that discriminatory
animus motivated the adverse employment action).
dismissed by the trial court and this aspect of the dismissal has not been appealed. Thus, Frogley's
evidence of pretext bares no similarity to the evidence in Chuang which was deemed sufficient to rebut
the employer's non-discriminatory reasons and thereby preclude summary judgment. Id.
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In the instant case, Supt. Clark identified (Clark Aff, pp. 4-5, R. 153-154; Linda
Clark Ur., Exhibit "B" to Clark Aff, R. 157-158.), and the trial court adopted the following
evidence of Respondents' non-retaliatory reasons for not renewing Frogley's contract:
Frogley "did not appropriately schedule and adhere to an
observation schedule and meet the requirements of
supervision and evaluation of teaching staff to which he was
assigned," that Frogley "did not engage in student
supervision and evaluation of teaching staff to which he was
assigned," that Frogley "did not engage in student
supervision to the level expected," that "[t]here have also
been instances where Mr. Frog ley's interaction with students
has been problematic including at least two allegations of
harassment from students," and finally, that Frogley "has not
regularly met his requirements for attending IEP and Section
504 meetings under his responsibility." (Aff. of Dr. Clark Ex.
B.) The evidence of student harassment is enough
individually to support the adverse employment action,
let alone the evidence of failure to perform his job functions
adequately.
(Memo. Dec., pp. 24-25; R. 431-32; emphasis added.)
In his Brief, Appellant identifies reasons why he disagrees with Supt. Clark's
bases for recommending non-renewal; however he never identifies any evidence
sufficient to allow a fact-finder to conclude that Respondents did not believe its reasons
for the adverse employment action, and that the reasons were actually a "pretense" for
illegal retaliation. Vil/arimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (91h Cir.
2002) ("courts 'only require that an employer honestly believed its reasons for its
actions, even if its reason is 'foolish or even baseless"').
For example, Appellant claims the student harassment cited by Supt. Clark was
"petty" in nature, that the timing of the complaints was suspect, and that failure to
question Frogley shows they were not sufficient to warrant "disciplinary action." (App.
Br., p. 17.) These reasons, however, fail to show that Respondents' belief that student
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harassment had occurred was not honestly held by Respondents. Indeed, Frogley
admits that the incidents and reports (including a parent's complaint; see, Doreen C.

email, Exhibit "N" to Mayben Aff, R. 101) actually did occur, and Appellant merely
argues that the incidents were petty and that their timing was suspicious. (App. Br., p.
17.) However, the law is clear that it is permissible for an employer to have a "foolish or
baseless" reason for its action (non-renewal of employment contract) as long as it
honestly believes its reasons for the action. Villarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063. For these
reasons, Appellant essentially admits that the incidents actually occurred, and he never
submits any evidence that the Respondents did not believe this was a reason for nonrenewal. The Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed on this basis
alone. Id.
Appellants' claim that the student reports were not sufficient to warrant
"disciplinary action" is a red herring because the decision to not renew an
administrator's employment contract carries a much lower standard than disciplining a
certificated employee during the term of his contract. See, IC § 33-513(3) (employing
principals); see also, IC § 33-513(5) (setting forth reasons for terminating a contract
during its term). Non-renewal of an administrator's one year contract may occur based
solely on dissatisfaction with performance, or a personality clash with his or her
supervisor. See, IC§ 33- 513(3). Indeed, at best, the reasons cited by Appellant leads
to the conclusion that Principal Mayben did not like Frogley, but none of the stated
evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the stated reasons were a pretext,
AND that the true motivation was retaliatory animus. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1061

(evidence which establishes only what "could conceivably have occurred" does not give
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rise to a "reasonable inference that [retaliation] did in fact occur''; such evidence
requires "undue speculation" and the trial court's dismissal of plaintitrs retaliation claim
was therefore affirmed). This rule is necessary to ensure that the inferred conclusion is
not speculative regarding whether or not the stated reason is a pretext for

discrimination [or retaliation]. See, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
508 (1993) ("although [plaintiff] has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him,
he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated").
Quite simply, a principal can search for reasons to terminate an assistant principal he
does not like or does not trust. Id. This application of evidence to Title VII claims is
consistent with the Idaho legislature's recent statement of public policy which vests in a
school's principal the authority to approve all new personnel working under his
supervision. IC § 33-523 (" ... no certificated employee shall be transferred to a
principal's school without the principal's permission ... ").
Thus, Appellant's admitted reports of student harassment are certainly sufficient,
in and of itself, to support Respondents' decision to not renew Frogley's assistant
principal contract, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of
pretext should be affirmed. (Memo. Dec., p. 24, Cl. Rec., p. 432); Munoz, 630 F.3d at
865 ("Merely denying the credibility of the employer's proffered reasons is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment").
In addition, and just as significant of the purposes of summary judgment is the
fact that one of the four stated reasons for Frogley's non-renewal: that he "did not
engage in student supervision to the level expected," remains unrebutted. (See, App.
Br., pp. 13-17.) The undisputed evidence, therefore remains, showing that, although
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student supervision is an essential component of Frogley's job duties, he nonetheless
had repeatedly failed to satisfy this important job duty - and this was also a reason for
the non-renewal of his contract. (Maybon Aff, pp. 2-4, 10, 12-15; R. 43-45, 51, 53-56.)
The trial court's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed on this basis also. IRCP
56(c), (e).

In summary, indirect evidence of pretext must lead to the inevitable

conclusion that the reason for the adverse action was retaliatory. Godwin, 150
F.3d at 1222. If the indirect evidence leads to a contrary conclusion that is also
plausible, then the jury is asked to impermissibly speculate as to the cause of the
employment decision and summary judgment is appropriate. Godwin, 150 F.3d at
1222. Thus, although there may be an issue of fact as to the existence of certain
specific, substantial, circumstantial evidence of pretext which will preclude summary
judgment, the law requires that if the proffered evidence is found to exist by the jury - it
must lead to only one conclusion - that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for
retaliation; and if the evidence leads to more than one conclusion, then the
circumstantial evidence calls for speculation and is insufficient to rebut the employer's
stated reason summary judgment is appropriate. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222; St. Mary's

Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 508.

2.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO SHOW
EVIDENCE OF A DUTY OF CARE OWED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Appellant argues that the trial court misinterpreted Johnson v. McPhee and
failed to give Appellant the benefit of all reasonable inferences. (App. Br., p. 18.)
Specifically, Frogley relied on the distinction between a bench trial (in Johnson) and the
potential jury trial in the instant matter stating: "Contrary to the facts in Johnson v.
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McPhee, the case at bar involves a jury and, thus, the trial court was obligated to give

Mr. Frogley the benefit of all reasonable inferences." (App. Br., p. 18.) Appellant then
relies on two premises to support reversal of summary judgment, neither of which apply
to the facts in this appeal: {1) that employers in Idaho owe "a greater degree of respect
because other (sic) employment relationship" (Appellant's Brief, p. 18; citing, Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1466 (91h Cir. 1994)); and (2) that "the

defendant's constant humiliation of Mr. Frogley ... constant personal attacks ... and
imposition of disciplinary actions can foreseeability create sufficient stress and anxiety
to cause physical harm." (App. Br., p. 19.) These flawed premises are insufficient as a
matter of law to warrant reversal of the trial court's dismissal of this claim.
Specifically, Appellant's analysis errs in several respects. To begin, in Idaho,
there is no duty for an employer to treat its employees with a "greater degree of respect"
because of the employer relationship. Contrary to Appellant's representation in his Brief,
in the Steiner case the

gth

Circuit was interpreting Nevada tort law, and the court had

relied on a case applying Oregon law when it discussed the "greater respect" rule.
Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1466. This rule, however, is contrary to Idaho law which follows the

"at-will" employment doctrine. Edmundson v. Shearer, 139 Idaho 172, 176 (2003).
Appellant's interpretation also attempts to create a "civility code" in the employment
context which is clearly contrary to the duties employers owe under Title VII (and
correspondingly, the IHRA). Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75,
81 (1998) ("[The] standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure
that Title VII does not become a 'general civility code'.") Appellant has not appealed the
trial court's dismissal of his Title VII "hostile environment" claim, which dismissal is and
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was consistent with its dismissal of the negligent infliction claim. (See, Memo. Dec., pp.
20-22, R. 427-429.) Thus, as a matter of law, there is no duty in Idaho for an employer
to "be civil" to his or her employees and Appellant's reliance on such a novel rule is
clearly contrary to well settled principles of Idaho tort law.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Appellant has failed to accurately
represent several essential components of the Court's decision in Johnson which
discussed the elements of a negligent infliction of an emotional distress claim allegedly
caused by insulting and demeaning statements. Specifically, the court's holding in
Johnson where it stated there could be a duty to not verbally abuse another, only
arises where there is admissible evidence of the following circumstances: (1) that
the plaintiff demonstrated a significantly increased sensitivity to verbal abuse
compared to the general population's; AND (2) that the defendant was aware of this
condition and acted negligently under the circumstances. Johnson, 147 Idaho at 468.
In this case, Frogley has identified no admissible evidence that: (1) he was an
idiosyncratically sensitive

person;

nor has he (2) offered any evidence that

Respondents' agents had knowledge of such sensitivity (which did not exist) and
proceeded to act negligently under the circumstances. In the absence of any evidence
to support the above exception to the general rule which states "that insulting and
demeaning remarks" are insufficient to support a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Johnson, 147 Idaho at 468.
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim should also be affirmed. Johnson, 147 Idaho at
468.
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V. CONCLUSION
On the issues of pretext and tort duty of care, Appellant has failed to identify
sufficient, admissible evidence to allow these issues to go to a jury, and the trial court's
grant of summary judgment dismissing all of Appellant's causes of action, including the
Title VII (and IHRA) retaliation claims, and the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim which are the subject of this appeal, should be affirmed, IRCP 56(c), 56(e);

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220-1222 (91h Cir. 1998); Johnson v.
McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 468 (Ct. App. 2009).
Given there exists no reasonable basis in fact or law to support Appellant's
appeal,

attorney fees

and

costs to Respondents are appropriate

under the

circumstances. IC§§ 12-117, 12-121, /AP 40, 41.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this .;~ day of November, 2012.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
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Brian K. Julian, Ofe Firm
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2J- day of November, 2012, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by delivering the same to
each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as
follows:

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark and Feeney, LLP
P.O. Box 285
1229 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone (208)743-9516
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[ ]
[ ]
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Facsimile (208) 746-9160
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